It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.
Introduction
It is well known that if the entries of the normal form of a bimatrix game (in fact, of games with any number of players) can be perturbed independently then generically there is a finite number of equilibria (see van Damme, 1983; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . Kreps and Wilson (1982) criticized this result as not being very helpful when the normal form is derived from an extensive form since then many strategies lead to the same final node. In fact, even if the payoffs of the final nodes can be perturbed independently the finiteness of the number of equilibria is not a generic property, yet Kreps-Wilson showed that the finiteness of the number of equilibrium payoffs is a generic property in this case. In many applications this suffices.
However, the Kreps-Wilson criticism to the normal form result can be reiterated: it is very strong to assume that final nodes utilities can be perturbed independently. Typically, many final nodes will correspond to the same final position of a game and the most natural assumption may be that the final utilities depend on the position and not on the particular history of play (i.e. the node).
In this note it is showed that for bimatrix games it is still true that the number of equilibrium payoffs is generically finite, in whatever way the payoffs of final nodes are tied together by (linear) constraints.
The interest of this result is limited (or enhanced?) by the fact that it does not extend to more than two players. McLennan (1990) has a clever example to that effect. Suppose that possibility (1) of Lemma 2 holds for U 1 (hence for U 2 ). Then there is v 2 such that U 2 v 2 = e. Take now any solution (p 1 ,˛) to U T 2 p 1 =˛e, p 1 · e = 1. Then:
and so the only (completely mixed) equilibrium payoff for player 2 is
Since then˛/ = 0 this also implies that possibility (1) of Lemma 2 holds for U T 2 (hence for U T 1 ). We now repeat the argument. Choose v 1 such that U T 1 v 1 = e. Consider any solution (p 2 ,ˇ) to U 1 p 2 =ˇe, p 2 ·e = 1. Then:
and so the only (completely mixed) equilibrium payoff for player 1 iš
Finally, the argument is completely symmetric (in fact just a matter of labelling) if possibility (1) of Lemma 2 holds for U T 2 .
